Desires, norms and constraints by Cholvy, Laurence & Garion, Christophe
Desires, norms and constraints
Laurence Cholvy
ONERA Toulouse
2 av. e´douard Belin
31055 Toulouse Cedex 4
cholvy@cert.fr
Christophe Garion
SUPAERO
10 av. e´douard Belin
31055 Toulouse Cedex 4
garion@supaero.fr
Abstract
This paper deals with modeling mental states of a ratio-
nal agent, in particular states based on agent’s desires.
It shows that the world the agent belongs to forces it
to restrict its desires. More precisely, desires of a rational
agent are restricted by the constraints that exist in the world
and which express what is possible or necessary. Further-
more, if the agent is law-abiding, its desires are restricted
by the regulations that are defined in the world and which
express what is obligatory, permitted or forbidden.
This paper characterizes how desires are restricted de-
pending on the fact that the agent is law-abiding or not.
This work considers the general case when the agent or-
ders its own desires according to a preference order.
The solution is based on modeling desires, regulations
and constraints in an unique formal system which is a logic
of conditional preferences.
1. Introduction
The present work belongs to the domain of modeling
mental states of a rational agent. More precisely, we aim
at modeling the desires of an agent who belongs to a
multi-agent context and determining among its desires those
which can be chosen to be achieved. We intend to show
that the agent’s desires are restricted by some external ele-
ments. More precisely, if the agent is rational, its desires are
restricted by domain constraints; furthermore, if it is law-
abiding, then its desires are restricted by norms.
Domain constraints, for instance laws of the nature, ex-
press situations that are possible (or in other terms, discard
situations that are impossible). The impact of constraints on
the desires of a rational agent is obvious: this reflects the
fact that a rational agent will restrict its desires to achiev-
able ones. For instance, even if an agent desires to live more
than 150 years, this will not be achievable.
On the other hands, norms are social elements which pre-
scribe agents’ behavior in any multi-agent context. They
state what is permitted, obligatory or forbidden. For in-
stance, paying taxes is obligatory.
The main difference between constraints and norms is
that norms can be violated. Thus, an agent can be law-
abiding or not.
In the literature, the most famous framework for mod-
eling mental states of agents is the BDI model [16] which
considers that Beliefs, Desires and Intentions are the basic
elements for the agent when taking a decision about how to
act on the world. Desires are internal motivational states ex-
pressing situations that the agent prefers and wants to bring
about. Intentions are the deliberative states expressing de-
sired and reachable situations that the agent has selected and
committed to achieve.
Based on the idea that social concepts like obligations or
more generally norms are important to “glue” autonomous
agents in a Multi-agent System, the BDI model has recently
been extended in order to take into account obligations and
norms [5], [11].
Agreeing with these works, we show that norms may re-
strict desires of an agent if he is law-abiding. Furthermore,
we add that domain constraints restrict desires of an agent
if he is rational.
Notice that our model focuses on desires. In comparison
to BDI model, it does not take into account beliefs nor inten-
tions. This is mainly because this work was motivated by an
application in Requirement Engineering in which consider-
ing these notions is not meaningful.
However, the originality of the present work is that we
consider a case which is rather general, in which we allow
the agent to order its own desires according to a preference
order.
Notice that a similar problem is studied in [1] and ad-
dressed in the possibilistic logic framework. However, as
far as we know, this work does not consider norms.
As said previously, the main application we foresee to
this work belongs to Requirement Engineering. Indeed, in
Requirement Engineering, requirements express the prop-
erties an agent expects the artefact will satisfy [12], [14]. In
other terms, requirements are, for the agent, its desires about
the artefact to be build. As soon as the requirements are ex-
pressed, it is important to take into account the physical con-
straints that exist on the real world and which state what is
possible. Besides, it is also important to take into account
the regulations that exist in the domain and which state what
is permitted or obligatory or forbidden. Indeed, before en-
tering the design phase and the manufacturing phase, one
must check if the properties expressed by the agent’s re-
quirements do not characterize an artefact which cannot be
built (due to the constraints) or which will violate a regula-
tion.
In this present work, we show that an unique formalism
(Boutilier’s logic of conditional preferences [3]) can be used
to model desires of the agent, domain constraints and norms
as well. Using a single formalism allows us to easily define
the influence of constraints and norms on the restriction of
desires.
This paper is organized as follows. Section2 presents
the conditional preference logic CO. Sections 3, 4 and 5
show how desires, norms and constraints are modeled in
CO. Section 6 presents the general mechanism according to
which desires are restricted by constraints and norms. Sec-
tion 7 applies this general mechanism to the cases when the
agent is or is not law-abiding. Section 8 describes an exam-
ple. Finally, section 9 is devoted to a discussion.
2. The CO logic
The CO logic is a logic developed by Craig Boutilier to
represent and reason on conditional preferences [3, 2].
2.1. Semantics
Boutilier considers a bimodal propositional languageLB
based on a set of atomic propositional variables PROP
with the usual connectives and two modal operators 2 et
←
2.
CO’s semantics is characterized by Kripke models of the
form 〈W,≤, val〉 where:
• W is a set of possible worlds.
• ≤ is a total preference preorder on W (a reflexive and
transitive relation on W 2). If w and w′ are two worlds
of W , then w ≤ w′ means that w is at least as pre-
ferred as w′.
• val is a valuation function on W 1. For any formula ϕ
of W , val(ϕ) is the set of worlds of W which classi-
1 I.e. val : PROP → 2W and val is such that val(¬ϕ) = W −
val(ϕ) and val(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = val(ϕ1) ∩ val(ϕ2).
cally satisfy ϕ. As usually, we will denote val(ϕ) by
‖ϕ‖ (cf. [6]).
For any CO-model M = 〈W,≤, val〉, the truth condi-
tions for the modal connectives 2 and ←2 are:
• M |=w 2ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W such that w′ ≤P w then
M |=w′ ϕ.
• M |=w
←
2 ϕ iff ∀w′ ∈ W such that w′ 6≤P w then
M |=w′ ϕ.
2ϕ is true at a world w if and only if ϕ is true at all
worlds at least as preferred as w (including w). ←2 ϕ is true
at world w if and only if ϕ is true at all the worlds less pre-
ferred than w. Boutilier then defines two dual modal opera-
tors : 3ϕ ≡def ¬2¬ϕ means that ϕ is true at some equally
or more preferred world and←3 ϕ ≡def ¬
←
2 ¬ϕ means that
ϕ is true at some less preferred world.↔2 ϕ ≡def 2ϕ∧
←
2 ϕ
and↔3 ϕ ≡def 3ϕ∨
←
3 ϕ correspond respectively to classi-
cal necessity and possibility (cf. [6]).
The validity of a formula ϕ is defined as follows: let
M = 〈W,≤, val〉 be a CO-model. A formula ϕ is valid
in M (noted M |= ϕ) iff ∀w ∈ W M |=w ϕ. ϕ is CO-
valid (noted |=CO ϕ) iff for any CO-model M, M |= ϕ. ϕ
is satisfiable iff ¬ϕ is not valid.
For instance, figure 1 presents CO-model M such that
M |=
↔
2 α (because all the worlds satisfy α) and M |=w2
2β (because all the worlds at least as preferred as w2 sat-
isfy β).
w1 w2 w3
α
β
¬γ
≤
α
β
γ
≤
α
¬β
¬γ
Figure 1. A CO-model
Finally, the consequence relation is defined by:
Definition 1 Let Σ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕn} be a set of CO formu-
las. A formula ψ is a consequence of Σ, denoted by Σ |= ψ
iff for all CO-model M, M |= ∧
i∈{1,...,n}
ϕi ⇒ M |= ψ.
2.2. Conditional preferences in CO
According to Boutilier, preferences are formulas of the
form I(β|α) which signify that ”ideally, if α is true, then β
is true”. Formally, the I operator is defined by:
I(β|α) ≡def
↔
2 ¬α∨
↔
3 (α ∧ (2α→ β))
Thus, if we consider aCO-modelM, I(β|α) will be sat-
isfied in M iff:
• either α is not true in every world of W ;
• either there is a worldw which satisfies α and such that
all the worlds at least as preferred as w satisfy α→ β.
I(β) is defined as I(β|>). Moreover, the dual notion of
tolerance is denoted by T (β|α) ≡def ¬I(¬β|α). Notice
that there are other approaches to conditional preferences,
based on ideality [15, 18] or for instance ceteris paribus
[17, 4].
3. Desires representation
3.1. The notion of position
Starting from Cholvy and Hunter work on requirements
representation [10], we consider that the desires of an agent
are propositional formulas (of a given language PROP ) on
which the agent expresses a priority order. The definition of
the agent’s desires is then a tuple, called “agent position”
defined as follows:
Definition 2 The position of an agent is a tuple of
propositional formulas of a given language PROP
Γ = [α1, . . . , αn] such that {α1, ...αn} is consistent. Each
αi is a desire of the agent. Moreover, αi precedes αj in
the tuple Γ iff the agent considers αi to be more impor-
tant than αj .
The position [α1, α2] intuitively means that, for the
agent, the most important desire is to bring it about that
α1 ∧ α2 holds. But, if it is not possible (due to external el-
ements), then its second more important desire is to bring
it about that α1 ∧ ¬α2. If it still impossible, then its third
more important desire is to bring it about that ¬α1 ∧α2. Fi-
nally, the worst case for the agent is when the only possible
desire is to bring it about that ¬α1 ∧ ¬α2, i.e. a for-
mula which violates its primary desires.
More formally, Cholvy and Hunter have shown that a po-
sition [α1, ..., αn] induces a preorder on possible worlds de-
fined by the lexicographic order on the set {‖ β1 ∧ ... ∧
βn ‖ : βi ∈ {αi,¬αi}} − ∅.
Example 1 Consider an agent who desires to buy a house.
He wants the house not to be close to a subway station (be-
cause it is noisy) or to be well soundproofed and it also
wants the house to be near to a subway station if it is not
downtown. The first part of the desire is more important
for the agent than the second. Let us consider the proposi-
tional variablesP (the house is soundproofed),S (the house
is near to a subway station) and D (the house is down-
town). We can express the agent’s desires by the position:
Γ = [¬S ∨ P,¬D → S]. This position corresponds to the
following preorder on possible worlds:
‖(¬S∨P )∧ (D∨S)‖ ≤ ‖(¬S∨P )∧ (¬D∧¬S)‖ ≤ ‖(S∧
¬P ) ∧ (D ∨ S)‖ ≤ ‖(S ∧ ¬P ) ∧ (¬D ∧ ¬S)‖
Thus, worlds satisfying (¬S∨P )∧(D∨S) are more pre-
ferred than the worlds satisfying (¬S ∨ P ) ∧ (¬D ∧ ¬S),
which are themselves more preferred than the worlds satis-
fying (S ∧¬P ) ∧ (D ∨ S), which are themselves more pre-
ferred than the worlds satisfying (S ∧ ¬P ) ∧ (¬D ∧ ¬S).
This means that the most preferred desire for the agent
is to bring it about that its house satisfies ¬S ∨ P and
¬D → S. If this is impossible, then the most important de-
sire will be to bring it about that its house verifies ¬S ∨ P
and not ¬D → S. If it is not possible yet, then the most im-
portant desire will be to bring it about that the house satis-
fies ¬D → S and not ¬S∨P . Finally, in the worst case, the
remaining desire is to bring it about that the house does not
satisfy neither ¬D → S nor ¬S ∨ P (notice that this is in-
consistent here).
3.2. Representing desires in CO
In this section, our aim is to show that every position can
be translated into a set of CO formulas. In order to do that,
we first build the CO formulas associated to each “cluster”
of worlds ordered by the preorder corresponding to a posi-
tion.
Definition 3 Let {α1, . . . , αn} be a consistent set of propo-
sitional formulas. Let f[α1,...,αn] : N → PROP be
the function which makes correspond each integer i ∈
{0, . . . , 2n − 1} to the propositional formula α1(i) ∧ . . . ∧
αn(i) in the following way:
• i is broken down into i =
n−1∑
k=0
ck(i) ∗ 2n−1−k with
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} ck(i) = 0 or ck(i) = 1;
• ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n} αk(i) =
{
αk if ck−1(i) = 0
¬αk if ck−1(i) = 1
Example 2 In the case of example 1, the result is:
fΓ(0) = (P ∨ ¬S) ∧ (S ∨D)
fΓ(1) = (P ∨ ¬S) ∧ ¬(S ∨D) ≡ ¬S ∧ ¬D ∧ P
fΓ(2) = ¬(P ∨ ¬S) ∧ (S ∨D) ≡ ¬P ∧ S ∧D
fΓ(3) = ¬(P ∨ ¬S) ∧ ¬(S ∨D) ≡ ⊥
We now restrict function f in order to obtain only satis-
fiable propositions:
Definition 4 Let {i0, . . . , im} ⊂ {0, . . . , 2n−1} be the set
of integers such that ∀j ∈ {i0, . . . , im} fΓ(j) is satisfiable.
f ′Γ is such that ∀j ∈ {0, . . . ,m} f ′Γ(j) = fΓ(ij)
Example 3 Continuing 2, we obtain:
f ′Γ(0) = (P ∨ ¬S) ∧ (S ∨D)
f ′Γ(1) = (P ∨ ¬S) ∧ ¬(S ∨D) ≡ ¬S ∧ ¬D ∧ P
f ′Γ(2) = ¬(P ∨ ¬S) ∧ (S ∨D) ≡ ¬P ∧ S ∧D
Let us note that function f ′ allows to find the “clusters”
of ordered worlds corresponding to the preorder build from
the agent’s position, i.e. ‖f ′Γ(0)‖ ≤ ‖f ′Γ(1)‖ ≤ ‖f ′Γ(2)‖.
We now build a set of CO formulas from the set of for-
mulas defined by f ′. The models of thoseCO formulas will
correspond to the previous preorder.
Definition 5 We note :
α <E β ≡def
↔
3 (α∧
←
2 ¬α ∧2¬β)
Definition 6 Let Γ = [α1, . . . , αn] be the agent’s position.
This position is represented by the following set of CO for-
mulas noted ΓCO:
ΓCO =
⋃
i∈{0,...,m−1}
{f ′Γ(i) <E f
′
Γ(i+ 1))}
Definition 7 We say that α <Γ β iff ΓCO |= α <E β.
Theorem 1 <Γ is an order on PROP formulas.
Proof 1 There are three properties to verify:
• <Γ is an irreflexive relation
The proof is easy: let us suppose that <Γ is not an
irreflexive relation, then there are two propositional
formulas α and β such that α <Γ β and α ≡ β (in
the logical sense). Thus ΓCO |=↔3 (α∧ ←2 ¬α∧2¬β).
As α ≡ β, ΓCO |=
↔
3 (α∧
←
2 ¬α ∧ 2¬α).
Let M = 〈W,≤, val〉 be a model of ΓCO. There is
a world w0 of W such that M,w0 |= α ∧ 2¬α, so
M,w0 |= α ∧ ¬α which is impossible.
• <Γ is an antisymmetric relation
Let us suppose that<Γ is a symmetric relation, then
there are two propositional formulas α and β such that
ΓCO |= α < β and Γ |= β < α. Let M = 〈W,≤, val〉
be a model of ΓCO. In this case:
1. ∃wα such that M,wα |= α ∧ 2¬β
2. ∃wβ such that M,wβ |= β ∧ 2¬α
Let us suppose that wα ≤ wβ , then in this case,
M,wα |= α ∧ ¬α, which is impossible. The proof is
the same for the case where wβ ≤ wα.
• <Γ is a transitive relation
Let α, β and γ three propositional formulas such
that ΓCO |= α < β and ΓCO |= β < γ. Thus α <Γ β
and β <Γ γ.
Let M = 〈W,≤, val〉 be a model of Γ. Then :
1. ∃wα such that M,wα |= α ∧ 2¬β∧
←
2 ¬α
2. ∃wβ such that M,wβ |= β ∧ 2¬γ∧
←
2 ¬β
Let us suppose that wβ ≤ wα, then M,wβ |= β ∧
¬β because M,wα |= 2¬β, so wα ≤ wβ .
AsM,wβ |= 2¬γ,M,wα |= 2¬γ. ThusM,wα |=
α ∧ 2¬γ∧
←
2 ¬α, and ΓCO |= α < γ.
Theorem 2 Let Γ = [α1, . . . , αn] be the agent’s posi-
tion. The CO-models 〈W,≤, val〉 of ΓCO are such that:
‖f ′Γ(0)‖ ≤ . . . ≤ ‖f
′
Γ(m)‖.
Proof 2 Let Γ = [α1, . . . , αn] be the agent’s position. Let
M = 〈W,≤, val〉 be a model of ΓCO. Let j ∈ {0, . . . ,m−
1}, we denote by wj the world of W such that M,wj |=
f ′Γ(j)∧
←
2 ¬f ′Γ(j) ∧ 2¬f
′
Γ(j + 1).
First, let us prove that ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}wj−1 ≤ wj .
Let j ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}, then M,wj−1 |= 2¬f ′Γ(j). But
M,wj |= f ′Γ(j) so wj−1 ≤ wj .
Let j ∈ {0, . . . ,ma − 1}, there are two cases:
• either j 6= 0 ans in this case M,wj |= f ′Γ(j)∧
←
2
¬f ′Γ(j). Thus ∀w ∈ ‖f ′Γ(j)‖ w ≤ wj .
Moreover, M,wj−1 |= 2¬f ′Γ(j), so ∀w ∈ ‖f ′Γ(j)‖
wj−1 ≤ w.
As ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} wj−1 ≤ wj , we can
write that M,wj−1 |=
∧
l∈{0,...,j−1}
←
2 ¬f ′Γ(l) and
that M,wj |=
∧
l∈{j+1,...,m}
2¬f ′Γ(l). Thus, for all
w ∈ W , if w ≤ wj and wj−1 ≤ w, M,w |=∧
l ∈ {0, . . . ,m}
l 6= j
¬f ′Γa(l).
Let w ∈ W such that w ≤ wj and wj−1 ≤ w.
If for all l ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, we write f ′Γ(l) = α1(l) ∧
. . . ∧ αn(l), then ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} l 6= j ⇒ M,w |=
¬α1(l) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬αn(l).
By building of f ′Γ, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} l 6= j ⇒ ∃lj ∈
{1, . . . n} such that αlj (l) ≡ ¬αlj (j).
As ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} l 6= j ⇒ M,w |= ¬α1(l) ∨
. . . ∨ αn(l), M,w |= α1(j) ∧ . . . ∧ αn(j). Thus
M,w |= f ′Γ(j).
The models of f ′Γ(j) are then the worlds w ∈ W
such that w ≤ wj and wj−1 ≤ w.
• let j = 0, M,w0 |= f ′Γ(0)∧
←
2 ¬f ′Γ(0) so ∀w ∈
‖f ′Γ(0)‖, w ≤ w0.
Moreover, we can write that M,w0 |=∧
l∈{1,...,m}
2¬f ′Γ(l) from the previous proof, ∀w ∈ W ,
w ≤ w0 ⇒M,w |= f ′Γ(0).
Finally, M,wm−1 |= 2¬f ′Γ(m) thus ∀w ∈ ‖f ′Γ(m)‖
wm−1 ≤ w. Moreover, M,wm−1 |=
∧
l∈{0,...,m−1}
←
2
¬f ′Γ(l), so ∀w ∈W wm−1 ≤ w ⇒M,w |= f
′
Γ(m).
Notice that the coding of the agent’s position in CO al-
lows to retrieve the same preorder on possible worlds as
Cholvy and Hunter.
Example 4 Let us resume 1: Γ = [¬M ∨ I,¬C → M ].
Thus ΓCO = {(I∨¬M)∧(M∨C) < ¬M∧¬C∧I,¬M∧
¬C ∧ I < ¬I ∧M ∧ C}.
As a conclusion, we have shown in this section that ev-
ery ordered set of desires can be modeled into a set of CO
formulas. This set of formulas is such that its models re-
spects the intuitive idea we can give on ordered worlds.
In the next section, we take an interest in norms repre-
sentation.
4. Representing norms with CO
We showed in [7, 8, 9, 13] how to model normative sen-
tences with CO formulas. Those sentences can be simple
obligations, permissions, prohibitions (like for instance, it is
forbidden to build a house in a non permitted area , it is al-
lowed to paint shutters green), but also complex normative
sentences like norms with exceptions (like for instance it is
forbidden to paint shutters green, unless the house is not
near to an historical building) or Contrary-to-Duties (like
for instance it is forbidden to paint shutters colored, but if
shutters are paint colored, it should be a light shade).
In the following table, we list the translations of norma-
tive sentences into CO formulas. We do not detail why we
choose such translations nor the remaining representation
problems (cf. previously cited papers).
it is obligatory that α is true I(α)
it is allowed that α is true T (α) ≡ ¬I(¬α)
it is forbidden that α is true I(¬α)
it is normally forbidden that α I(¬α) ∧ ¬I(¬α|β)
bu if β is true, then α is
allowed
it is normally forbidden that α I(¬α) ∧ I(α|β)
but if β is true then α is
obligatory
Contrary-To-Duty :
(RP) it is forbidden that α is true I(¬α)
(CTD) but if α is true, then it is I(β|α)
obligatory that β is true
A regulation is a set of normative sentences or norms, of
the previous form.
5. Representing domain constraints with CO
Domain constraints are for instance physical constraints.
They represent what is necessarily true in the real world.
Expressing domain constraints in the CO logic is easy, be-
cause it amounts to restrict the set of possible worlds to
worlds verifying the constraints. This is formally expressed
by the following definitions.
Definition 8 A domain constraint of the form ”proposition
α is always true” is represented by the CO formula ↔2α.
Thus, the constraints “downtown, houses always cost
more than 100,000 euros” can be modeled into the formula
↔
2(D → ¬L) (D represents the fact that a house is down-
town and L the fact that it costs less than 100,000 euros).
The CO-models of this formula are such that the world
{D,L} is not a possible world.
Definition 9 A set of domain constraints C is a consistent
set of formulas of the form ↔2α.
6. Restriction of desires by taking norms and
constraints into account
In this section, we study the impact of norms and con-
straints on the restriction of the agent’s desires.
First of all, we have to check that the set of norms is com-
patible with the constraints. This means intuitively that the
regulation represented by the set of norms does not obliges
something that is impossible or forbid something that is nec-
essarily true.
6.1. Compatibility between norms and domain
constraints
Definition 10 Let R be a set of normative sentences. R is
compatible with the domain constraint ↔2ϕ iff ∀ψ such that
ψ ∧ ϕ is satisfiable, then R |= ¬I(¬ϕ|ψ). R is compatible
with the set of domain constraints C = {↔2ϕ1, . . . ,↔2ϕl} iff
R is compatible with ↔2(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕl).
Example 5 Let us consider the following regulation : ev-
ery house must be connected to the electrical network,
but if a house is not connected, then it must be equipped
with a generator. This regulation is modeled by the set
{I(elec), I(gen|¬elec)}. Let us suppose that the domain
constraints are such that it is impossible for the house to
be equipped with a generator. In this case, the regulation is
not compatible with the domain constraints. Indeed, there
are situations (when the house is not connected to the elec-
trical network) in which it is obligatory to equip the house
with a generator although it is impossible.
6.2. Tolerated states
Definition 11 Let R be a regulation and C a set of domain
constraints. We note:
T (R, C) =
∨
R|=¬I(¬ϕ) and |=↔3ϕ
ϕ
T (R, C) is a formula whose models are the states toler-
ated by the regulationR under the constraints C.
The following result proves that the set of states toler-
ated by a regulation which is compatible with the domain
constraints cannot be empty.
Theorem 3 Let R be a regulation compatible with a set of
domain constraints C. ‖ T (R, C) ‖6= ∅
In order to prove this theorem, just remark that if R is
compatible with C = {↔2 ϕ1, . . . ,
↔
2 ϕl}, then ϕ1 ∧ . . .∧ϕl
is a conjunction of T (R, C).
6.3. Restriction of desires
Definition 12 Let ΓCO be the CO formulas expressing the
agent’s desires. Let R be a regulation and C a set of do-
main constraints such that R is compatible with C. The re-
striction of the agent’s desires taking R and C into account
is denoted ΓCOmin. It is defined by:
ΓCOmin = {ϕ : Γ
CO |= I(ϕ|T (R, C))}
The restriction of desires by taking R and C into ac-
count is the set of the formulas which are true in the mini-
mal worlds for the preorder defined by ΓCO given the toler-
ated states.
Theorem 4 There are formulas which are not tautologies
and which belong to ΓCOmin
Proof 3 Let us suppose that ΓCOmin contains only tautolo-
gies.
Let M = 〈W,≤, val〉 be a model of ΓCO. There are two
cases:
• either M |= ¬T (R, C) and then M |= I(ϕ|T (R, C))
for every formula ϕ (notice that this case never hap-
pens, because
∨
i∈{1,...,m}
f ′(i) ≡ > and T (R, C) 6= φ).
• either ∃(wo, . . . , wl) ∈ Wn such that ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , l}
M, wi |= T (R, C).
Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , l} such that ∀i ∈ J ∀j ∈
{1, . . . , l} wi ≤ wj (remember that by definition
of ΓCO, all the worlds of W are comparable). In
this case, as M is a model of ΓCO, there is i0 ∈
{1, . . . ,m} such that ∀j ∈ J wj ∈ ‖f ′(i0)‖ (by defi-
nition of ΓCO).
Moreover, by definition of ΓCO again, consider-
ing any model M of ΓCO , i0 is unique (i.e. the best
T (R, C) are always in the same ”cluster” of worlds).
As all the worlds of ‖f ′(i0)‖ verify f ′(i0), then
ΓCO |= I(f ′(i0)|T (R, C)).
Thus, there is always a set of restricted desires which are
compatible with the regulation and the domain constraints.
This is because the preorder induced by the agent’s position
considers all the worlds, even those which contradict all the
agent’s desires.
7. Attitudes of the agent towards the regula-
tion
As said in the introduction, an agent can have two atti-
tudes towards the law: whether he does not care about obey-
ing the law or he does.
In the first case, the previous general process is used to
restrict the agent’s desires, by considering an empty regula-
tion, i.e. R = φ.
In the case of an law-abiding agent, the previous gen-
eral process is used to restrict the agent’s desires with a non
empty regulation, i.e. R 6= φ.
Notice also that this approach is flexible. We could
model an agent who wants to obey only a part of the reg-
ulation.
8. Example
We consider an agent which wants to build a house. Its
desires concerning its future house are:
• it desires that its house is downtown or near to a sub-
way station,
• it desires that the house has white walls,
• it desires that the house costs less than 100,000 euros
and is situated in a quiet area.
The position of the agent respects the order given in the
previous enumeration.
The city the agent wants to build its house in is such that
the area close to a subway station is not quiet. Moreover,
houses situated downtown always cost more than 100,000
euros.
Finally, the city regulation stipulates that downtown, it is
forbidden to paint walls white.
We consider the following propositional variables: D
(the house is downtown), S (the house is near a subway sta-
tion), W (the walls of the house are white), L (the house
costs less than 100,000 euros),Q (the house is a quiet area).
The agent’s position, the set of domain constraints and
the regulation are respectively:
Γ = [D ∨ S,W,L ∧Q]
C = {
↔
2(S → ¬Q),
↔
2(D → ¬L)}
R = {I(¬W |D)}
Let us remark that C is a consistent set of CO formulas
and that R is compatible with C.
The set of CO formulas which models the agent’s posi-
tion is:
ΓCO =
{(D ∨ S) ∧W ∧ (L ∧Q) < (D ∨ S) ∧W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q),
(D ∨ S) ∧ W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q) < (D ∨ S) ∧ ¬W ∧ (L ∧Q),
(D ∨ S) ∧ ¬W ∧ (L ∧ Q) < (D ∨ S) ∧ ¬W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q),
(D ∨ S) ∧ ¬W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q) < (¬D ∧ ¬S) ∧ W ∧ (L ∧ Q),
(¬D ∧¬S)∧W ∧ (L∧Q) < (¬D ∧¬S)∧W ∧ (¬L∨¬Q),
(¬D∧¬S)∧W ∧ (¬L∨¬Q) < (¬D∧¬S)∧¬W ∧ (L∧Q),
(¬D∧¬S)∧¬W ∧(L∧Q) < (¬D∧¬S)∧¬W ∧(¬L∨¬Q)}
1. case of a law-abiding agent
• Let us consider the most preferred formula, that
is to say (D∨S)∧W∧(L∧Q). We can verify that
its models are not tolerated states, because there
are not states compatible with the domain con-
straints. Indeed, ((D ∨ S) ∧ (L ∧ Q)) ∧ ((S →
¬Q) ∧ (D → ¬L)) is not satisfiable.
• Let us now look at the models of the formula just
less preferred, i.e. (D ∨ S) ∧W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q).
Some of its models are not tolerated states.
Particularly, the worlds satisfying D are not tol-
erated because they also verify W (yet regula-
tion forbids D ∧W ). The models of (D ∨ S) ∧
W ∧ (¬L ∨ ¬Q) which verify ¬D also satisfy
S. However, among those models, only those
which verify ¬Q are tolerated states (because
of the first constraint). Thus, the two models of
(D∨S)∧W ∧(¬L∨¬Q) which are tolerated are:
{¬D,S,W,¬T,Q} and {¬D,S,W,¬T,¬Q}.
The formula whose models are
{¬D,S,W,¬T,Q} and {¬D,S,W,¬T,¬Q} is
S ∧ ¬D ∧W ∧ ¬Q.
Thus finally, ΓCOmin = {¬D ∧ S ∧ ¬Q ∧W}.
The agent’s restricted desires are thus: the house is
not downtown; however it is close to a subway station
and thus not in a quiet area; finally, it will have white
walls
2. case of a non law-abiding agent
In the case when the agent does not take into ac-
count the regulation, its restricted desires are:
• the house is situated downtown, thus it is not less
than 100,000 euros; it is near a subway station,
thus not in a quiet area; it has white walls, or
• the house is situated downtown, thus it is not less
than 100,000 euros; it is not close to a subway
station; it has white walls, or
• the house is not situated downtown, but it is near
a subway station, thus not in a quiet area; it has
white walls.
9. Discussion
This work intends to show that the desires of an agent
may be restricted by external elements such as norms and
constraints. This restriction is a consequence of the atti-
tude of the agent. Any rational agent must take into account
constraints in order to restrict its own desires. Furthermore,
law-abiding agents must also take into account regulations.
Since we allow the agent to express a preference order
on its desire, we guarantee that there will always be a set of
restricted desires, if the regulation is, of course, compatible
with the constraints.
Modeling desires, norms and constraints in an unique
formalism allows us to provide a simple semantical char-
acterization of the restricted desires.
However, this work suffers from a too simple agency
model. This is why some results can be discussed. For in-
stance, in the example detailed in section 8 (case of a law-
abiding agent), the fact that the house is not in a quiet area
belongs to the set of restricted desires can be discussed.
The main reason for discussing this is that the agent will
have no influence on the fact that the area is quiet or not,
once he will decide that the house is downtown. This is due
to the constraints.
Thus, we suggest to modify definition 12 as follows:
ΓCOmin = {ϕ : Γ
CO |= I(ϕ|T (R, C))
and ϕ is controllable by the agent }
The notion of controllable variables could be based on
Boutilier’s one [3] by also taking constraints into account.
This extension is currently foreseen.
Another interesting extension of this work is to consider
the case of several agents, each of them having its own de-
sires. The problem will then be to merge the agents’ de-
sires and characterize the restricted desires of the group of
agents, by taking into account constraints and norms.
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